Recently, Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) have been intensively researched to overcome unstable communication due to the intermittent link connection in wireless communications. In wireless DTNs, to enable continuous connectivity, data are exchanged through intermediate nodes in the path toward the destination node by store-andforward approach. However, since the participating nodes in the network are not fully trusted, a secure data exchange mechanism in the DTNs would be strongly desirable. In this paper, we propose a secure data exchange system in the wireless DTNs using Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) to provide two properties: (i) content data can be accessed by only authorized nodes that are dynamically defined by a policy on the attributes while keeping its integrity from alteration during transmission, and (ii) routing messages are encrypted and authenticated such that only the attributebased authorized nodes can exchange the routing messages, where multi-hop routing messages are encrypted and authenticated by the ABE. Our experimental results show the practicality of our system.
Introduction
As mobile devices with wireless connectivity are rapidly deployed, multi-hop wireless infrastructure-less networks have been paid attentions. The networks include Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [7] , Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) [20] , Vehicle Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) [9] , etc. In such networks, mobile devices construct their own autonomous network topology to communicate with each other, by exchanging routing messages to update their routing tables. The network topology may change either quickly or slowly, depending on the mobility of participating nodes, and moreover the mobile devices may join or leave to and from the network (e.g., moving away from the network and running out of the battery). This potentially causes an unstable link connection in the path from source node to destination node. DTNs (Delay Tolerant Networks) [21] , [28] , [29] , [30] with routing consideration [3] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [18] , [24] , [25] to overcome the intermittent link connection have been intensively researched. In a DTN, the link between nodes with unstable connectivity can be established properly by store-and-forward approach [29] . In this approach, packets are stored in an intermediate node in the path toward the destination node while the link to the next node in the path is not available, and the packets are forwarded to the next node after the link becomes available. As example scenarios where the DTNs are applicable, the military operations [22] and the mobile environment [23] are considered. In the applications 1 Department of Electrical Engineering, Electronics Engineering Polytechnic Institute of Surabaya (EEPIS), Surabaya, Indonesia where content data are exchanged using the DTN, participating nodes store and forward the content data and exchange the routing messages. In DTNs, routing protocols are important to construct the autonomous networks, and thus the routing protocols such as flooding routing protocols and forwarding routing protocols have been comprehensively investigated, examined, and compared [18] , [25] to improve the delay and performance for transferring data from source node to destination node.
However, in DTNs, the participating nodes are not fully trusted, and an adversary may participate in the network. Therefore, a security mechanism in DTNs for such non-trusted environments would be strongly desirable. To prevent unauthorized node's access to the content data exchanged among the nodes, we can apply some cryptosystems between end nodes, as follows. Before sending the data, the source node encrypts the data, which is forwarded and successfully decrypted only by the group of authorized destination nodes. In the access control, the flexibility and granularity of the access control is required, which depends on the adopted cryptosystem. The previous works [19] , [20] employed Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [15] for encrypting the content data exchanged in DTNs. The access is controlled using the attribute possession of the nodes, where a secret key corresponding to each own attribute is issued securely during the initial registration phase. Encrypted original data can only be accessed by authorized nodes that are dynamically defined by a policy on the attributes. Thus, using ABE, we can achieve a flexible finegrained access control based on the node's attributes. In Ref. [19] , the authors proposed and implemented an access control scheme based on an ABE [15] in DTNs. They showed an example of the battlefield DTN scenario for several members of different ranks from US Army and Navy. Meanwhile, Ref. [20] described a flex-ible security solution in DTNs to let messages destined to representative names to be sent securely such that adversaries are not able to eavesdrop the messages easily. The solution implemented a prototype system using JAVA based RAPID router [17] . However, in the existing ABE-based schemes, only the confidentiality of the content data is addressed, but the security of routing messages is not considered. The routing message is very important information for all nodes in DTNs to update their routing tables in selecting the best path toward the destination node. Thus, the routing messages also should be hidden and authenticated.
In this paper * 1 , we propose a secure data exchange system in the wireless DTNs, where the routing messages are hidden and authenticated using the ABE, in addition to the content data. Furthermore, we implement a prototype system with multi-hop routing, and show the experimental results to confirm the practicality. For the multi-hop routing, we adopt the flooding routing strategy [18] , [25] , concretely epidemic routing protocol [3] to construct an autonomous network topology: a node sprays its routing message to all neighbor nodes. Then, neighbor nodes relay the message to other adjacent nodes. In this strategy, it replicates the message to adequate nodes, where each node can update its routing table. Our motivation to employ the ABE in our system is to distribute the secret key used for a symmetric encryption and message authentication to the attribute-based authorized nodes so that the confidentiality and integrity of routing messages can be ensured.
In our system, a key distributor node firstly encrypts the symmetric key using the ABE and distributes it to all participating nodes together with the node's signature on the encrypted symmetric key and the certificate which includes the node's public key. The use of the digital signature and certificate is to guarantee that the transmitted encrypted symmetric key is originated from the key distributor node and not altered during transmission. Only the nodes that match a particular attribute policy are able to extract the key after verifying the key distributor node's signature. Then, the routing message is encrypted and authenticated by AES and MAC using the shared symmetric key. Thus, only the authorized participating nodes (indicated by the ABE) are able to exchange routing messages to construct a secure network topology. In addition, after establishing the best path between source node and destination node, by using the authenticated ABE for another particular attribute policy, the content data is encrypted using hybrid approach, whereas content data is encrypted using AES with temporary symmetric key. The temporary key for AES is encrypted using ABE, where the resulting ciphertext is sent together with encrypted content data and the signature of the ciphertexts with the certificate, and then they are exchanged to the authorized nodes. In our implementation, we employ a data access authorization for the network administration of IT department structure in our attribute policy scenario.
Security Requirements of Proposed Data Exchange System in Wireless DTNs
Tselikis et al. [4] identified security requirements in the DTN * 1 The preliminary versions of this paper were presented in Refs. [13] , [14] .
at the bundle level. In the DTN, the bundle is a packet containing important data exchanged hop by hop through the bundle protocol. Bundles are routed in a store-and-forward mechanism between nodes over the bundle layer through the bundle protocol. Participating nodes in the wireless DTN, which receive, store, and forward data as the intermediate node, can easily access and read the bundles. Meanwhile, everyone including an adversary has a possibility to join the wireless DTN without any permission from a network administrator. Then, the adversary can illegally transmit bad data, or intercept the important data, modify, and retransmit it. In such situation, the most serious threats are against the content data exchanged among the nodes. The adversary joining the wireless DTN may access the content data in the bundle that is stored and forwarded hop by hop. The content data must be read by only the authorized target nodes, and the integrity must be ensured.
In addition to the security for content data, our motivation for the security consideration in the wireless DTN is to address the vulnerability of the routing protocol in wireless DTNs. Another one of important data exchanged among participating nodes is the routing message. When the nodes act as intermediate nodes, they are able to receive and re-advertise the routing messages from and to neighbor nodes in constructing and renovating an autonomous wireless DTN with the store-and-forward feature. Then, an adversary who acts as the relay node can confuse the routing in the autonomous network by distributing fake routing messages to other nodes. As a result, the adversary may stop routing messages to specific nodes. Since routing messages are potentially broadcasted to all neighbor nodes, the adversary may cause a traffic congestion of routing messages due to redundant routing messages distribution. Therefore, to protect the adversary's poisoning the routing messages, we require the integrity of the routing messages.
On the other hand, routing messages can potentially reveal the sensitive routing information that is useful for outside adversaries. For example, the network topology may provide the adversaries with the important information of attacking points and holes for network attacks such as Denial of Service (DOS). Thus, we also require the confidentiality of the routing messages.
Based on the above consideration, we define the security requirements in the proposed system over wireless DTN as follows:
Security of routing protocol. -Confidentiality of routing messages: No node except authorized nodes is able to fetch the routing messages exchanged among the authorized nodes. -Integrity of routing messages: Only authorized nodes are able to participate in the routing mechanism, receive, and re-advertise the routing messages to other nodes. In other words, routing messages should be authenticated to guarantee that routing messages are derived from only authorized nodes and not modified during propagation. Security of content data.
-Confidentiality of content data: No node except the authorized nodes is able to fetch the original content data. -Integrity of content data: The exchanged content data should be authenticated to guarantee that the content data c 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan are not modified by non-authorized nodes during the storeand-forward mechanism.
Adopted Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we review the ABE scheme [15] , the symmetric encryption and message authentication, and digital signature, which are adopted in our proposed secure data exchange system in wireless DTN.
Attribute Based-Encryption Scheme
Bethencourt et al. [15] proposed the concept of a Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) scheme, as a type of ABE. In this scheme, a message M is encrypted with an access policy of attributes. The access policy is expressed by a logical relation on attributes. When a user, i.e., a node in the DTN setting, owns a set of attributes, the node is initially issued the secret key that is assigned to each own attribute from a trusted authority (Key Generator Server). Then, the encrypted M is decrypted based on the matching of the access policy and the node's attributes. Only the nodes who have a match to the policy are able to successfully extract the original M. Thus, using CP-ABE, the flexible fine-grained access control based on user's attributes can be achieved. In this scheme, there are three players involved in the system (as shown in Fig. 1 ) and four algorithms as follows:
Setup: This algorithm is performed by a Key Generator Server. On given a security parameter, this algorithm randomly generates the public parameters PK and a master key MK. PK will be used for encryption and decryption mechanisms, meanwhile MK is used for generating nodes' secret keys.
KeyGen: This algorithm is executed by Key Generator Server. On given a set of attributes S i of node i, public parameter PK, and the master key MK, it randomly generates the node's secret key S K i that associates with S i . Encryption: This algorithm is operated by all participating nodes including routers that will act as encryptor. On given message M, an access policy of attributes T , and the public parameters PK, it randomly computes a ciphertext CT . Decryption: This algorithm is operated by all participating nodes that will act as decryptor. The inputs of algorithm are public parameter PK, ciphertext CT , and a secret key S K i bound to a set of attributes S i . If and only if S i satisfies the attribute policy T associated with CT , it is able to recover the original message M. Table 1 shows an example of attributes and the values. Let consider an example that a user i has a set of attributes, S i = ("Male," "Lecturer," "A University," "Information Tech.," "3rd fl A Building"). On given a ciphertext with an access policy of attributes, T = ("Dean" ∨ ("Lecturer" ∧ "Information Tech.")), then user i has the attributes satisfying the policy structure and thus can decrypt the ciphertext. However, if T = ("Dean" ∨ ("Staff" ∧ "Information Tech.")), user i's attributes do not satisfy the policy, and hence user i cannot decrypt the ciphertext.
As another type of ABE, a Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) scheme has been proposed [16] . In KP-ABE, the user's secret key is generated from the access policy, and the ciphertext is correspondent to attributes, where only the user with the policy satisfied by the ciphertext's attributes can decrypt the ciphertext. For the scenario of the wireless DTN considered in this paper, the CP-ABE is used, and the KP-ABE is not used. Although any CP-ABE scheme can be adopted, the CP-ABE middleware of the scheme [15] is utilized in our implementation.
Symmetric Encryption and Message Authentication
For the fastness of encryption and message authentication, we adopt the hybrid approach: A symmetric key is encrypted by the CP-ABE. Using the shared symmetric key, the content data and routing messages are encrypted and authenticated.
For the symmetric encryption, we can utilize AES [1] , where an encryptor encrypts data with any size using the shared symmetric key and the corresponding decryptor can decrypt the ciphertext using the same key. As the symmetric message authentication, MAC (Message Authentication Code) is used for checking the integrity of messages sent between the ends sharing the key. We utilize HMAC as the concrete instance of MAC.
For the authenticated encryption using the symmetric key, there are 3 approaches: (1) Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) which firstly message is encrypted, then a MAC is created based on the encrypted message, (2) Encrypt-and-MAC (E&M) which firstly a MAC is created on message, then the message is encrypted without MAC, and (3) MAC-then-Encrypt (MtE) which firstly a MAC is created on message, then the message and its MAC are together encrypted. Among them, EtM approach provides the highest security in authenticated encryption when the used MAC is strongly unforgeable [2] , [11] , and becomes a standard method to ISO/IEC [12] . Thus, we adopt EtM approach in routing message.
Digital Signature
We adopt an RSA-based digital signature and the public key [1] , to guarantee the legitimacy of source nodes and to prevent the alteration of the encrypted keys.
Routing Protocols in DTN
In DTN, the exchange of routing messages also follows the store-and-forward mechanism. The nodes have the capability to store incoming routing messages in the buffer. When the routing message is exchanged between two or more nodes in the transmission range of each other, the nodes deliver them to the other relay nodes toward destination node [8] , [18] , [25] . In the mobile ad-hoc network, to deliver data from a source node to a destination node, firstly the setup phase is performed to determine a path from the source node to the destination node. Secondly, the data transmission and the maintenance of routing messages are done until the transmission is over. In DTN, the strategy of routing protocols is mainly comprised into two strategies: flooding family of routing protocols that replicate the routing messages to adequate nodes toward the destination node, and forwarding family of routing protocols that utilize the knowledge about the network status to determine the best path toward the destination node.
Flooding family: In the flooding routing protocol, the replicas of same routing messages will be delivered to relay nodes toward the destination node. No knowledge about the network status among nodes is needed to operate this protocol. This routing protocol has some advantages: (i) high probability for successful messages delivery, and (ii) high probability to link the source node with the destination node in the transmission range. Forwarding family: The knowledge about network status including network topology is required in order to find the best path from the source node to the destination node. The difference from the flooding routing protocol is that this protocol does not need any message replication, but parameters regarding the network have to be exchanged to estimate each path. This protocol has the advantages: (i) the network resources including bandwidth, storage and energy are not wasted, (ii) the network congestion does not happen, and (iii) the network is scalable.
Proposed Secure Data Exchange System Using ABE
In this section, we describe our proposed system construction of a secure data exchange system using ABE in a wireless DTN.
Overview of System Construction
The proposed system mainly utilizes the CP-ABE scheme [15] . In the similar way to the previous works [19] , [20] , the exchanged content data are encrypted using the CP-ABE, and the ciphertext is sent from the source node to the destination node in the storeand-forward way of the DTN. Due to the hybrid approach, the temporal key is encrypted by CP-ABE, and the content data is encrypted by AES on the key. To ensure the legitimacy of the content data, a digital signature with the certificate is employed.
In addition, the routing messages are also encrypted and authenticated using the CP-ABE, as follows. A symmetric key en- crypted by the CP-ABE is distributed from a representative routing node to all participating nodes with attributes showing the routing privilege, where the encrypted key is also authenticated by the digital signature. An advertiser node encrypts the routing message using AES, to which the MAC authenticating the encrypted message is appended. This is why only authorized routing nodes can update their routing tables. Our proposed system architecture is described in Fig. 2 .
Our Approach of Secure Data Exchange in Multi-hop
Routing In this paper, we consider wireless DTNs, where mobile devices may move quickly or slowly, join to the network, move away from the network, or run out of the battery. In addition, we consider sparse networks, where the connection of devices is intermittent, but the congestion of communication is rare. The store-and-forward mechanism in DTNs enables the stable communication in the networks. In such a setting, the flooding family of routing protocols is better than the forwarding family, since the higher deliver probability is expected, while the congestion due to lots of replications does not happen.
In the surveys about routing protocols in DTN [18] , [25] , there are some flooding routing strategies such as direct contact, twohop relay, tree-based flooding, epidemic routing, prioritized epidemic routing, and probabilistic routing. Among them, we adopt the epidemic routing [3] of flooding family. Epidemic routing is flooding-based in nature, where every node continuously replicates and transmits routing messages to adjacent nodes including newly joining nodes that have not yet possessed a copy of the routing message. Generally, this protocol is used in the most simple case, since epidemic routing causes only flooding of routing messages. Because of this simplicity, the security mechanism based on CP-ABE can be more easily integrated. In addition, the epidemic routing protocol has the multiple-hop count needed for multi-hop routing, supports routing based on a routing table, and achieves the low latency.
In our construction of multi-hop data exchange in DTN, we divide the system into four phases: key generation phase, symmetric key distribution phase, path establishment phase, and content data transfer phase. In our proposed system, the path establishment phase is separated from the symmetric key distribution c 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan phase. For the path establishment phase, the symmetric key distribution phase has to be executed once beforehand. In a fixed interval, each node can exchange its routing message encrypted using the same symmetric key to relay nodes, where the timeconsuming CP-ABE encryption/decryption are not needed.
Construction of Proposed System
In the construction and implementation, we assume a simple multi-hop scenario, where four mobile nodes (Node 1 to Node 4) participate and each node sequentially communicates to the successive node in turn. We consider that our construction in this setting can represent the essentials of wireless DTN with the above-mentioned security. This is because the performance of routing process and transmission process in the secure wireless DTN can be demonstrated and measured in participants of sender node, relay nodes, and a receiver node. Furthermore, in this setting of two relay nodes, we can demonstrate a 2-hop communication scenario including the situations of a relay node's leaving or re-joining. The implementation and measurements for the more realistic settings with more nodes and non-sequential communications are our future works.
Each phase of our proposed system is as follows.
Key Generation Phase
This phase is initially executed out of wireless DTN and conducted by Key Generator Server (KGS). Here, we assume that KGS also acts as a Certificate Authority (CA). Every joining node i has already been generated a key pair, i.e., secret key sk i and public key pk i , and CA has issued the public key certificate Cert i to joining node i. In addition, we assume that every node owns the public key of CA to verify the certificate. Moreover, KGS issues a secret key that corresponds attributes of each node. This phase is illustrated in Fig. 2 . We adopt the Setup and Key-Gen algorithms of CP-ABE scheme [15] . Firstly, KGS generates public key parameters PK and master key MK. KGS obtains and confirms the set of attributes of each joining nodes (i.e., Node 1 to Node 4). Let assume S i be a set of attributes of Node i. On supplied (MK, S i ), KGS creates a secret key S K i that associates with S i , and returns S K i along with PK to the joining Node i.
We adopt the scenario in some IT departments of a campus, and each node has attributes of the building of the room, department name, position, etc. Moreover, we assume that some nodes have attributes of developers or administrators. These could be the routing-initiator nodes when starting to flood routing messages to their adjacent nodes.
Symmetric Key Distribution Phase
This phase has a goal to distribute a symmetric key K to all participating nodes. The symmetric key K consists of two key elements, K AES and K HMAC , where K AES is a key for AES and K HMAC is a key for HMAC authentication. These keys will be used for encrypting and authenticating routing messages exchanged among all participating nodes. The routing message will be encrypted by AES using symmetric key K AES along with its MAC and sent to all relay nodes, in the following path establishment phase. In our scenario, we choose the routing-initiator node as a symmetric key generator node. Let assume that Node 1 is the symmetric key generator node. The protocol is shown in Fig. 3 . The symmetric keys K AES and K HMAC are 128-bit randomly selected by the symmetric key generator node. Then, they are encrypted by the CP-ABE with the attribute policy showing the routing privilege, and distributed from the symmetric key generator node to all participating nodes (i.e., Node 2, Node 3, and Node 4). Namely, the symmetric key generator node creates a ciphertext CT K = Enc CP−ABE (PK, T 1 , K AES ||K HMAC ), where Enc CP−ABE is the CP-ABE Encryption algorithm, and T 1 is the access policy of attributes. In our scenario, we consider an example of the policy in Fig. 4 , which can be represented as: T 1 = ("ITDeveloper" ∧ ("SystemTeam" ∨ "NetworkTeam")) ∨ ("SysAdmin" ∨ "NetAdmin").
To ensure that CT K is really distributed from a legitimated key generator node, i.e., to prevent CT K from being modified during the transmission, Node 1 signs CT K using its secret key sk 1 , as S ig K = S ign(CT K , sk 1 ), where S ign is the signing function. Then, Node 1 distributes CT K together with S ig K and its certificate obtained from the CA, Cert 1 which carries its public key pk 1 .
Upon receiving CT K , S ig K , and Cert 1 , every authorized node firstly verifies Cert 1 . If and only if Cert 1 is valid, then the node extracts Node 1's public key pk 1 from Cert 1 . Furthermore, the extracted pk 1 is used for verifying S ig K , by the verifying function Veri f y(S ig K , pk 1 ). If and only if the verification is valid, then the node decrypts CT K to obtain the symmetric keys K AES and K HMAC by CP-ABE decryption algorithm Dec CP−ABE (PK, S K i , CT K ) using node's secret key S K i . Assuming that the nodes own the attributes of the developer or admin such as "SysAdmin," then the nodes can decrypt the CT K , since c 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan the attribute fulfills the access policy T 1 . Hence, only the nodes with the attribute matching to access policy T 1 are able to obtain valid K AES and K HMAC that are distributed from the symmetric key generator node. On the other hand, unauthorized nodes including adversaries are not able to recover the valid K AES and K HMAC .
The distribution process in the symmetric key distribution phase is also illustrated in Fig. 3 . To distribute the symmetric keys K AES and K HMAC from Node 1 as the symmetric key generator node to Node 2, Node 3, and Node 4, we employ the same distribution process as the epidemic routing protocol over a DTN which enables store-and-forward approach. Firstly, Node 1 sprays CT K , S ig K , and Cert 1 to participating nodes in its transmission range over DTN. If no participating node in the transmission range, CT K , S ig K , and Cert 1 are stored and then whenever nodes exist in its transmission range, CT K , S ig K , and Cert 1 are forwarded to the nodes. Let assume Node 2 is in the transmission range of Node 1, thus CT K , S ig K , and Cert 1 are sprayed to Node 2. Upon receiving CT K , S ig K , and Cert 1 , after verifying Cert 1 and S ig K , by using its secret key S K 2 , Node 2 decrypts CT K to obtain K AES and K HMAC . Then, Node 2 forwards CT K , S ig K , and Cert 1 to other nodes in its transmission range. Let assume Node 3 is in the transmission range of Node 2, then Node 3 receives CT K , S ig K , and Cert 1 , verifies Cert 1 and S ig K , and decrypts CT K to get K AES and K HMAC . This process is continued from the sprayed nodes to the neighbor nodes in turn (e.g., from Node 3 to Node 4).
Path Establishment Phase
Using K AES and K HMAC obtained in the symmetric key distribution phase, a routing-initiator node starts to encrypt the routing message using AES, whereas the MAC authenticating the encrypted routing message is appended. The protocol is shown in Fig. 5 . Assume that Node 1 is a routing-initiator node. Firstly, Node 1 computes a ciphertext CT 1 = Enc AES (M 1 , K AES ) on routing message M 1 and then generates a MAC on CT 1 using K HMAC , MAC 1 = HMAC(CT 1 , K HMAC ), where Enc AES is AES Encryption. Furthermore, Node 1 sprays CT 1 together with its MAC, CT 1 ||MAC 1 to all relay nodes. Assume that Node 2 is in the transmission range with Node 1. Then, Node 2 decrypts CT 1 to obtain M 1 received from Node 1 if and only if the received CT 1 is valid by comparing the received MAC 1 and its computed MAC using its symmetric key K HMAC , MAC 1 = HMAC(CT 1 , K HMAC ). Then, Node 2 updates its routing table based on the routing message M 1 from Node 1. In the similar way, Node 2 (resp., Node3) securely transmits its routing message M 2 (resp, M 3 ) to Node 3 (resp., Node 4) in turn. In a fixed interval, each node can exchange its encrypted routing message along with the MAC of encrypted routing message to relay nodes using the same symmetric key.
When the relay nodes are not in the transmission range with the advertiser node due to their mobility, running out the battery or other cases, the advertiser node stores the ciphertext and its MAC. When a relay node appears in the transmission range, the advertiser node forwards the data to the relay node. Figure 6 illustrates the data transfer mechanism. This phase is executed by the nodes in the path from a source node to the destination node in the wireless DTN, after the path is established. Assume that Node 1 wants to share its resources (e.g., message, text, image, photo, or video files) to Node 4 in Fig. 6 . As an example of the access policy, we consider T 2 in Fig. 7 , which is represented as: T 2 = ("ITBuilding" ∧ "HeadOfITDiv") ∨ ("ITDept" ∧ "ITBuilding" ∧ "StaffOfITDept") ∨ ("HeadOfITDept" ∨ "HeadOfAdminDiv").
Content Data Transfer Phase
Assume that Node 4 owns the attributes satisfying T 2 such as "HeadOfITDept." Firstly, Node 1 selects randomly a 128bit temporary key K T AES and encrypts the key using the access policy T 2 as CT M1 = Enc CP−ABE (PK, T 2 , K T AES ). Then, Node 1 encrypts the content data M using AES encryption with K T AES , CT M2 = Enc AES (M, K T AES ). For the ciphertexts, CT M = CT M1 ||CT M2 , Node 1 signs CT M using its secret key sk 1 , S ig M = S ign(CT M , sk 1 ). CT M , S ig M , and Cert 1 are sent together to Node 4 via the established path using the DTN mechanism of c 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan the store-and-forward method. Note that for every content data exchange, the source node freshly generates 128-bit temporary key, K T AES .
Upon receiving the encrypted content data CT M , S ig M , and Cert 1 from Node 1, firstly Node 4 verifies Cert 1 , if and only if Cert 1 is valid, Node 4 extracts pk 1 from Cert 1 and verifies S ig M using pk 1 , by Veri f y(S ig M , pk 1 ). If and only if the verification is valid, Node 4 decrypts CT M1 by using its secret key S K 4 corresponding the attributes satisfying the policy T 2 , K T AES = Dec CP−ABE (PK, S K 4 , CT M1 ), and successfully fetches the valid temporary key for AES decryption, K T AES . Then, Node 4 decrypts CT M2 using AES decryption with K T AES , M = Dec AES (CT M2 , K T AES ).
Security Discussion
Here, we discuss that the proposed system meets the security requirements defined in Section 2.
Security of Routing Protocol
When nodes act as the relay nodes, they receive and redistribute the routing messages from and to their adjacent nodes in establishing and maintaining a wireless DTN topology through store-and-forward mechanism. Here, we introduced two 128-bit symmetric keys K AES and K HMAC . In the symmetric key distribution phase, the keys are encrypted by CP-ABE related to the attribute policy T 1 and distributed. Unauthorized nodes that do not possess attributes satisfying the attribute policy T 1 cannot decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the keys. The CP-ABE ciphertext CT K for the symmetric keys is signed by the symmetric key generator node (Node 1), and the signature S ig K and the public key certificate Cert 1 are distributed and verified by other nodes. Thus, it is ensured that CT K and the keys are generated by the authorized originator (Node 1) and not modified by non-authorized nodes. Therefore, only authorized nodes can share the symmetric keys. On the other hand, the routing message of Node i, M i is encrypted by AES using K AES in the path establishment phase. Thus, routing messages are kept secret to unauthorized nodes, including adversary nodes. This is why the confidentiality of routing messages holds.
Similarly, in the path establishment phase, the symmetric key K HMAC shared among the authorized nodes is used for authenticating M i through MAC to guarantee the originality of M i . Thus, the routing messages from only the authorized nodes with the key K HMAC can be accepted as valid routing messages in the routing protocol. Thus, unauthorized nodes including adversary nodes are not able to distribute fake routing messages. This is why the integrity of routing messages holds.
Security of Content Data
The temporal key K T AES is encrypted by CP-ABE related to the attribute policy T 2 . Thus, only the authorized nodes are able to extract the temporal key. Furthermore, K T AES is used for encrypting M. Hence, the content data are hidden for the nonauthorized nodes. In addition, the ciphertext of key and ciphertext of M are signed, and the signature and the certificate are sent and verified by the receiver. Thus, it is ensured that the data are originated from the legitimated sender node and not modified by the non-authorized nodes. Therefore, the confidentiality and integrity of content data hold.
Implementation and Experimental Measurements
In this section, we describe our implementation of multi-hop routing data transfer using the CP-ABE and present the experiment results to show the effectiveness of the proposed system.
Our implementation was built on top of the underlying DTN system, which adopted DTN2 with standard protocols and architecture in Ref. [28] . Reference [28] is a reference of DTNRG: Delay Tolerant Networking Research Group which deals with request for comments (RFCs) standard on DTN architecture: RFC 4838 [29] and RFC 5050 [30]. The DTN2 system is implemented in C/C++ in supporting the multi-hop routing functionality. Furthermore, we also adopted a middleware [26] for the CP-ABE scheme [15] , which is implemented on the PBC (Pairing-Based Cryptography) library [27] in C language. The PBC library is for the pairing and the underlying ECC computations used in the CP-ABE. We added the AES and HMAC algorithms into the middleware. For the AES and HMAC, we use the 128-bit symmetric keys. In addition, we incorporated 2048-bit RSA-based digital signature and the public key certificate of X.509 to our implementation using OpenSSL API Library [31] . Figure 8, Fig. 9,  and Fig. 10 illustrate the implementations for the main phases.
In Fig. 8 for the symmetric key distribution phase, Node 1 acts as a symmetric key generator node, selects K AES and K HMAC , and encrypts them by CP-ABE Encryption using PK and T 1 , CT K = Enc CP−ABE (PK, T 1 , K AES ||K HMAC ). In addition, Node 1 c 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan Table 2 . Our measurements in three main phases of the implemented system are as follows.
Measurement for Symmetric Key Distribution Phase
The scenario of time measurement for symmetric key distribution is shown in Fig. 11 . t 0 is the time of CP-ABE encryption of symmetric key K which consists of K AES and K HMAC and signing time on CT K on Node 1. t 2 , t 4 , and t 6 are the time when CT K together with S ig K and Cert 1 are arrived, verification (which includes Cert 1 verification, pk 1 extraction from Cert 1 , and S ig K verification) is executed, and CT K is decrypted (i.e., CP-ABE decryption computation), and then the recovered symmetric key is stored in Node 2, Node 3, and Node 4, respectively. t 1 , t 3 , and t 5 are communication time to propagate ciphertext CT K together with S ig K and Cert 1 through IEEE802.11n WiFi connection. The total process of symmetric key distribution takes about 2, 726 ms, which is accumulation of t 0 to t 6 . The time of CP-ABE encryption for K AES ||K HMAC on T 1 is about 169 ms, signing time on CT K is about 43 ms, transmission time of CT K together with S ig K and Cert 1 in a link is about 679 ms, verification time is about 49 ms and CP-ABE decryption time for recovering K AES ||K HMAC is about 105 ms.
Measurement for Path Establishment Phase
We measured the processing times for updating the routing table. Upon receiving K, each node announces its routing information M i to all nodes every 180 seconds. The scenario of time measurement for routing message exchange is shown in Fig. 12 . Again, we assume that Node 1 is the routing-initiator node. t 0 , t 3 , and t 6 are AES encryption and HMAC generation time of routing messages M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 on Node 1, Node 2, and Node 3, respectively. These times are about 0.64 ms for AES encryption and 0.16 ms for HMAC computation. t 1 , t 4 , and t 7 are the communication times to propagate a couple of (CT i , MAC i ) through IEEE802.11n WiFi connection, which are about 493 ms. Meanwhile, t 2 , t 5 , and t 8 are the times of AES decryption, HMAC generation and comparison, and updating routing table on Node 2, Node 3, and Node 4, respectively, which are 0.53 ms for AES decryption, 0.29 ms for HMAC generation and comparison. Thus, the total time of routing message exchange on 2-hop among 4 nodes is about 1, 668 ms.
If the relay node Node 2 leaves the network, then a routing message exchange happens again, as shown in Fig. 13 . In this sitc 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan uation, the total time for the routing message exchange is about 1,305 ms. Figure 14 illustrates the situation where Node 2 rejoins to the network to construct the 2-hop routing message exchange. Here, all nodes reform the path from Node 1 to Node 4. This process requires the total time of 1,691 ms. Note that these times can exclude the time of the symmetric key distribution. From the results, the overhead of AES and HMAC is relatively small compared to the transmission time, and thus the proposed protocol is sufficiently practical. Table 3 shows the total times of transferring various types of data between Node 1 and Node 4 using CP-ABE based on access policy T 2 . After establishing the path from Node 1 to Node 4, we transfer various data from Node 1 to Node 4, where Node 2 and Node 3 are the relay nodes. To exchange a text file with 13 Bytes, it totally takes about 2, 672 ms, where the total encryption time is about 210 ms (197 ms for CP-ABE encryption and 0.54 ms for AES encryption), signing time is about 43 ms, the transmission time is about 2, 043 ms, the total verification time is about 48 ms (22 ms for certificate verification, 3 ms for Node 1's public key extraction, and 21 ms for signature verification), and the total decryption time is about 101 ms (87 ms for CP-ABE decryption and 0.34 ms for AES decryption). To exchange the image file with 176, 813 Bytes takes about 7, 721 ms, where the encryption time is about 218 ms (198 ms for CP-ABE encryption and 6 ms for AES encryption), signing time is about 45 ms, the transmission time takes 7, 063 ms, total verification time is about 51 ms (23 ms for certificate verification, 3 ms for Node 1's public key extraction from certificate, and 22 ms for signature verification), and the decryption time is about 107 ms (87 ms for CP-ABE decryp-tion and 6 ms for AES decryption). For exchanging the image file with 1, 298, 878 Bytes, we need 41, 086 ms. The encryption takes about 246 ms (199 ms for CP-ABE encryption and 44 ms for AES encryption) and the decryption time is 141 ms (88 ms for CP-ABE decryption and 38 ms for AES decryption). The signing time and total verification time are about 56 ms and 51 ms, respectively. The transmission time becomes 40, 201 ms. From these results, the total exchanging time is dominated by the transmission time. Furthermore, while the transmission time increases as the exchanged content data is larger, the encryption time and decryption time are relatively stable. Therefore, we can confirm that the overhead of adopting the CP-ABE is relatively small and practical.
Measurement for Content Data Transfer Phase

Conclusion
We have proposed a secure data exchange system with multihop routing in wireless DTNs using the Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). The ABE scheme is utilized for encrypting and authenticating the routing message exchange, in addition to the authorization for the exchanged content data. The experimental results show the practicality of our system in the current environment of laptop PCs.
Our future works include the adoption of more efficient CP-ABE schemes with faster pairing-based library, and the implementation and evaluation of the proposed system in more participating nodes.
